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INTRODUCTION 
Recent Supreme Court holdings have opened the door to 
unprecedented levels of campaign spending by both candidates and 
third parties.1  Independent spenders are unrestricted in the amount 
they spend in support of or in opposition to candidates.2  Public 
 
* Amy Loprest is the Executive Director of the New York City Campaign Finance 
Board. 
** Bethany Perskie is an Associate Counsel at the New York City Campaign Finance 
Board. 
 1. See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 
2806 (2011); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310(2010); Davis v. 
Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724 (2008); SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 2. Candidates are allowed to spend unlimited amounts of their own funds on 
their own campaigns as well. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
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financing systems are not permitted to provide additional financial 
assistance to publicly financed opponents of highspending, 
independently financed candidates.  To avoid having the entire 
spectrum of political speech dominated by wealthy individuals and 
special interest groups, state and local governments must administer 
public financing programs that maximize the impact of small 
contributions while avoiding the type of “trigger” system that the 
Court has deemed an unjustified infringement on First Amendment 
rights.3 
The New York City Campaign Finance Program (the “Program”) 
seeks to achieve this end with its low-dollar multiple match system, 
which awards public funds at a six-to-one ratio for small contributions 
to participating candidates, who must adhere to an overall 
expenditure limit.4  The multiple match element of the Program 
provides participants with the ability to challenge candidates who are 
heavily financed by their own personal funds and/or those of 
independent spenders.  Because the spending of an opposing 
candidate does not trigger an award of additional matching funds, the 
Program is compliant with the parameters set forth by the Supreme 
Court. 
This Article will address the evolution of the Court’s jurisprudence 
on high spending candidates and outside actors; judicial challenges to 
the Program; New York City’s experience with high spending 
candidates; the increasing prevalence of independent expenditures in 
federal and local elections; and how the City’s low-dollar multiple 
match functions as an effective and constitutional offset to these 
candidates and outside spenders.  The Article concludes that, despite 
the influx of money from independent spenders and wealthy self-
funded candidates, low-dollar multiple match public financing 
systems can ensure that ordinary citizens have a voice in today’s 
elections. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. History of the New York City Campaign Finance Act 
In the late 1980s, New York City government was racked by a 
series of scandals involving city officials soliciting favors from those 
 
 3. See infra notes 99–104 and accompanying text. 
 4. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-705 (2012). 
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seeking contracts with municipal government.5  Several officials went 
to prison and Donald Manes, Queens Borough President and head of 
the borough’s Democratic County Committee, committed suicide.6  
Gene Russianoff, an attorney for the New York Public Interest 
Research Group, stated that although the investigations did not 
actually involve campaign money, “there was a sense at the time that 
the scandals represented something broader . . . it was a concern 
about the culture.”7 
The Campaign Finance Act (the “Act”), proposed by then-Mayor 
Ed Koch, was passed by the New York City Council and signed into 
law on February 29, 1988.8  Its stated purpose was to bring greater 
accountability to the political system.9  On November 8, 1988, the 
public overwhelmingly approved a city Charter amendment 
establishing the independent and nonpartisan Campaign Finance 
Board (the “CFB” or “Board”) as a Charter agency.10  In passing the 
Act, the City Council found that: 
[B]oth the possibility of privilege and favoritism and the appearance 
of impropriety harm the effective functioning of government.  The 
council further finds that whether or not the reliance of candidates 
on large private campaign contributions actually results in 
corruption or improper influence, it has a deleterious effect upon 
government in that it creates the appearance of such abuses and 
thereby gives rise to citizen apathy and cynicism. 
The council further finds that it is vitally important to democracy in 
the city of New York to ensure that citizens, regardless of their 
personal wealth, access to large contributions or other financial 
connections, are enabled and encouraged to compete effectively for 
public office by educating the voters as to their qualifications, 
positions and aspirations for the city.11 
 
 5. See generally JACK NEWFIELD & WAYNE BARRETT, CITY FOR SALE: ED KOCH 
AND THE BETRAYAL OF NEW YORK (1988). 
 6. Id. at 97–104. 
 7. Jarrett Murphy, The Price of Politics: 20 Years of Campaign Finance Reform 
in New York City, CITY LIMITS, Fall 2008, at 6. 
 8. 1988 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 8. 
 9. Id. 
 10. N.Y.C. CHARTER ch. 46; N.Y.C. CHARTER REVISION COMM’N, DECEMBER 
1986–NOVEMBER 1988 REPORT 24 (1989). 
 11. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-714 Historical Note (2012); 1988 N.Y.C. Local Law 
No. 8.  The U.S. Supreme Court has since shown disfavor for part of this justification 
for campaign finance reform measures—increased electoral opportunity—as a 
legitimate government interest. See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club 
PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2825–26 (2011). 
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The 1989 citywide elections were the first test of the Program.  The 
CFB disbursed $4.5 million in public funds to thirty-six candidates.12  
The 1989 elections were also historic in that David Dinkins defeated 
three-term incumbent Koch in the Democratic primary, going on to 
become the city’s first African-American mayor.13  1993 brought 
another citywide election in which a challenger, Rudolph Giuliani, 
unseated the incumbent mayor, making Giuliani the first Republican 
mayor in twenty years.14  Voters also passed a referendum limiting all 
city office holders to two four-year terms.15 
The term limits first took effect during the 2001 citywide elections, 
also the first in which the Program employed a multiple match system 
for disbursing public funds.16  In October 1998, the City Council 
passed an amendment to the Act providing that candidates could 
receive public matching funds at a rate of $4-to-$1 in exchange for 
agreeing not to accept contributions from corporations.17  The 
following month, voters adopted a Charter amendment that 
prohibited candidates from accepting corporate contributions.  The 
CFB had issued an advisory opinion stating that if the Charter 
amendment passed, all candidates would be eligible for the $4-to-$1 
match.18  The Giuliani administration disagreed with this 
interpretation and challenged it in court.19  Before the court challenge 
 
 12. See N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: DOLLARS AND 
DISCLOSURE: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM IN NEW YORK CITY 99 (1990), available 
at http://www.nyccfb.info/press/news/per.htm. 
 13. Id. at 34–36. 
 14. See 1 N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., ON THE ROAD TO REFORM: CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE IN THE 1993 NEW YORK CITY ELECTIONS 77 (1994), available at 
http://www.nyccfb.info/press/news/per.htm. 
 15. 1993 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 94. 
 16. See N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., AN ELECTION INTERRUPTED... …AN 
ELECTION TRANSFORMED: THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE PROGRAM AND THE 2001 NEW 
YORK CITY ELECTIONS (2002) [hereinafter N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., REPORT ON 
2001 ELECTIONS], available at http://www.nyccfb.info/PDF/per/2001_PER/ 
2001_PER_Vol.1.pdf. 
 17. 1998 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 48; see also, N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., REPORT 
ON 2001 ELECTIONS, supra note 16, at 2.  The matching rate previously was one-to-
one for contributions up to $1,000.  The $4-to-$1 match was on contributions up to 
$250. See id. at ix. 
 18. Advisory Opinion 1998-2 (N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd. Oct. 23, 1998), 
http://www.nyccfb.info/act-program/ao/AO_1998_2.htm. 
 19. See ANGELA MIGALLY & SUSAN LISS, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, SMALL 
DONOR MATCHING FUNDS: THE NYC ELECTION EXPERIENCE 13 (2010), available at 
http://brennan.3cdn.net/8116be236784cc923f_iam6benvw.pdf. 
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was heard, the City Council amended the Act again, over Giuliani’s 
veto, to confirm the $4-to-$1 match.20 
The combination of term limits and the new multiple match system 
made the 2001 elections the busiest in the CFB’s history, with 353 
participating candidates and over $41 million in public funds 
disbursed.21  In addition, the terrorist attack on the World Trade 
Center on September 11, 2001 occurred on primary day.  The primary 
election was postponed and the CFB’s offices, located several blocks 
from the World Trade Center, were evacuated.  The CFB continued 
to operate from temporary offices at Fordham University’s Lincoln 
Center campus.22  The 2001 election also saw the first time in the 
Board’s history that a nonparticipant was elected mayor.  Michael 
Bloomberg spent over $73 million on that election, which raised 
questions about the continued viability of the matching funds 
program.  Mark Green, Bloomberg’s opponent in the general 
election, received public funds and spent $16 million in total—more 
than any other mayoral candidate in history aside from Bloomberg 
himself.23 
In 2005, the Act’s contribution limitations and prohibitions, as well 
as its disclosure requirements, were extended to all candidates for 
municipal office, regardless of whether they chose to participate in 
the voluntary public fund program.24  In 2007, the matching rate was 
increased again to $6-to-$1, with a maximum match of $1,050 (or up 
to a contribution of $175).25  That legislation also implemented strict 
contribution limits on those doing business with the city, in order to 
curb actual and perceived “pay-to-play” contributions.26 
One thing that has kept New York City’s matching funds program 
relevant and effective—unlike the presidential public financing 
system—is that the Program has adapted to changing circumstances 
(the increase in the matching rate and the new limitations described 
above provide two examples).  The Board is mandated to review how 
the Act worked in each election and make recommendations for 
 
 20. 2001 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 21; see also N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., supra 
note 16, at 3. 
 21. See N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., supra note 16, at 3. 
 22. Id. at ix. 
 23. Id. at 5. 
 24. 2005 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 105.  These limits were recently challenged and 
upheld by the state Supreme Court. See McDonald v. N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd., No. 
100038/2013, 2013 WL 1925022 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 1, 2013). 
 25. 2007 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 34. 
 26. Id. 
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changes.27  As a result, the Act has been amended twenty-one times 
since it first passed.28 
B. Provisions of the New York City Campaign Finance Act 
The CFB is a nonpartisan, independent board comprised of five 
members.29  The mayor appoints two of the members, not more than 
one of whom may be enrolled in any one political party.30  Likewise, 
the speaker of the City Council appoints two members, not more than 
one of whom may be enrolled in any one political party.31  The mayor 
appoints the chair in consultation with the Council speaker.32  The 
Board has a tradition of independence that has served it well.33  In 
addition to regulating campaign finance, the CFB oversees several 
different voter education initiatives.  For example, the CFB long has 
published the voter guide, which is a pamphlet that contains profiles 
of municipal candidates and voter education material.34  It is 
distributed to every household with a registered voter before both the 
primary and general elections.35  The voter guide is currently printed 
in English and Spanish citywide and in Chinese and Korean in 
Brooklyn, Queens, and Manhattan, pursuant to the Voting Rights 
Act.36  Additionally, since the 1997 elections, the CFB has sponsored 
debates among citywide candidates.37  All citywide candidates 
participating in the public matching funds program must appear in the 
 
 27. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-713 (2012); see also Murphy, supra note 7, at 8–9. 
 28. See 2007 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 23; 2007 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 34; 2007 
N.Y.C. Local Law No. 67; 2006 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 17; 2005 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 
105; 2004 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 58; 2004 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 59; 2004 N.Y.C. Local 
Law No. 60; 2003 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 12; 2003 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 13; 2003 
N.Y.C. Local Law No. 43; 2001 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 21; 1998 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 
27; 1998 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 39; 1998 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 48; 1996 N.Y.C. Local 
Law No. 90; 1994 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 37; 1993 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 68; 1990 
N.Y.C. Local Law No. 69; 1989 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 4. 
 29. N.Y.C. CHARTER § 1052(a)(1) (2009). 
 30. Id.; N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-708(1). 
 31. N.Y.C. CHARTER § 1052(a)(1); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-708(1). 
 32. N.Y.C. CHARTER § 1052(a)(1); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-708(1). 
 33. See Murphy, supra note 7, at 13–15. 
 34. See N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD. R. 10-02(a) (2010). 
 35. N.Y.C. CHARTER § 1053. 
 36. 42 U.S.C. § 1973.  For the 2013 elections, the guide will also be published in 
Bengali in certain areas of Queens. BD. OF ELECTIONS IN THE CITY OF N.Y., 
REGISTRATION & VOTING, available at http://vote.nyc.ny.us/downloads/ 
pdf/documents/boe/fourlanguages/registrationandvotingenglish.pdf. 
 37. Debate Program, N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., http://www.nyccfb.info/ 
debates/overview.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
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debates.38  Since January 2011, the CFB has also assumed 
responsibility for citywide voter engagement initiatives in conjunction 
with its Voter Assistance Advisory Committee.39 
The Act covers five municipal offices: three citywide (mayor, 
public advocate, and comptroller); borough president, for each of the 
five boroughs; and City Council, for each of the fifty-one districts.40  
All candidates for those offices, even those who choose not to 
participate in the Program, must provide comprehensive disclosure to 
the CFB.41  This disclosure is filed electronically and posted on the 
CFB’s website in both searchable and summary form.42 
All candidates must adhere to the Act’s strict contribution limits.43  
Citywide candidates, for example, may not accept aggregate 
contributions from a single source exceeding $4,950.44  These 
contribution limits apply throughout the primary and general 
elections.45  All candidates are subject to a post-election audit by the 
CFB and may be penalized for accepting over-the-limit 
contributions.46  Non-participating candidates may spend as much as 
they wish on their own campaigns,47 while participating candidates 
may spend up to three times the otherwise applicable contribution 
limit.48  There is a third class of candidate: limited participants.  These 
candidates agree to subject themselves to the spending limit, entirely 
self-fund their campaigns, and are ineligible to receive public funds.49 
 
 38. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-709.5 (2012). 
 39. N.Y.C. CHARTER § 1054(b). 
 40. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3-702(1), (13), (14). 
 41. See N.Y.C. CHARTER § 1052(a)(8); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-703(6). 
 42. Searchable Database, N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., http://www.nyccfb.info/ 
searchabledb (last visited Jan. 15, 2013); Campaign Finance Summary, N.Y.C. 
CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., http://www.nyccfb.info/VSApps/WebForm_Finance_ 
Summary.aspx?as_election_cycle=2009&sm=press_12 (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
 43. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-703(1)(f) (adjusted for inflation pursuant to N.Y.C. 
ADMIN. CODE § 3-703(7)).  The contribution limits for borough president and City 
Council are $3,850 and $2,750, respectively. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-703(7); 2013 
Limits, Requirements, and Public Funds, N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., 
http://www.nyccfb.info/candidates/candidates/limits/2013.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 
2013). 
 44. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-703(1)(f) (adjusted for inflation pursuant to § 3-
703(7)). 
 45. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-703(1)(a). 
 46. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3-710, 3-711. 
 47. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-719(2)(b). 
 48. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-703(1)(h). 
 49. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-718. 
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Contributions from individuals or entities doing business with the 
city are subject to stricter limits.  For example, the “doing business” 
contribution limit for citywide office is $400.50  “Doing business with 
the city” is defined broadly for these purposes.  It includes those 
associated with entities seeking or holding contracts, franchises, or 
concessions; entities which obtain grants, pension investment 
agreements, or economic development agreements; entities which are 
parties to real property transactions or land use actions; and 
registered lobbyists.51  Further, all candidates are prohibited from 
accepting contributions from corporations, limited liability 
companies, and partnerships.52  Finally, all candidates are subject to 
comprehensive audits by the CFB to ensure compliance with these 
limits and prohibitions and to ensure that the disclosure is accurate.53 
More relevant to this Article are the requirements of those who 
choose to opt into the voluntary public financing program.  
Candidates join the Program by filing a certification on or before 
June 10 in the year of the election.54  In the certification, among other 
things, the candidates agree to adhere to strict expenditure limits.  
These expenditure limits are divided into three periods: there is a 
spending limit for the period before the election year, for the primary 
election, and for the general election.  The primary and general 
election expenditure limit for mayoral candidates, for example, is 
$6,426,000.55 
In order to be eligible for public financing, candidates must be in 
compliance with the Act and Board Rules, appear on the ballot, be 
opposed on the ballot, and meet a two-part threshold, which is 
structured to guarantee that only candidates who achieve a certain 
 
 50. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-703(1)(a).  Contributions from these individuals are 
also not eligible to be matched with public funds. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-702(3)(h).  
The doing business contribution limits for borough president and City Council are 
$320 and $250, respectively. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-703(1-a); 2013 Limits, 
Requirements, and Public Funds, N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., 
http://www.nyccfb.info/candidates/candidates/limits/2013.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 
2013). 
 51. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-702(18). 
 52. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-703(1)(l). 
 53. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-710. 
 54. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-703(1)(c). 
 55. See generally N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-706.  These are adjusted for inflation. 
Id. § 3-706(1)(e).  The spending limit for public advocate and comptroller is 
$4,018,000. Id.  The spending limit for borough president is $1,446,000 and for City 
Council $168,000. Id.  The pre-election year limits are: $303,000 for citywide offices, 
$135,000 for borough president, and $45,000 for City Council. Id. 
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level of viability within their communities receive public funds.56  The 
first component of the threshold is a dollar threshold: candidates must 
raise a certain dollar amount in matchable contributions from New 
York City residents.57  The second component is the number 
threshold, which requires that candidates raise a certain number of 
contributions of at least $10 from contributors in the geographic area 
they seek to represent.58  For example, a City Council candidate must 
raise at least $5,000, including at least seventy-five contributions of 
$10 or more, from contributors within his or her Council district in 
order to receive public funds.59  Once a candidate has demonstrated 
eligibility, he or she is eligible to receive six dollars for every dollar in 
contributions he or she receives from New York City residents, up to 
$175.60  Thus, a $175 contribution from a New York City resident is 
worth $1,050 in public matching funds.  Public funds payments are 
capped at fifty-five percent of the applicable spending limit.61 
Participants who run against high spending nonparticipants are 
eligible to have their spending limit raised, and if the nonparticipating 
opponent’s spending reaches three times the applicable spending 
limit, the participant’s spending limit is lifted entirely.62  Prior to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s 
Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett,63 participants facing high spending 
nonparticipants were eligible to receive increased matching funds at a 
higher matching rate.64 
In November 2010, voters in New York City passed a Charter 
amendment requiring the CFB to promulgate rules regulating the 
 
 56. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-703(1)–(2), (5). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id.  The threshold for mayor is $250,000 and 1,000 contributions from city 
residents.  For public advocate and comptroller, the threshold is $125,000 and 500 
contributions from city residents.  For borough president, the threshold is 
contributions from 100 borough residents.  The threshold dollar amount is based 
upon the number of persons living in each borough.  The dollar amount (based on 
the 2010 census) for each borough is: Bronx, $27,702; Brooklyn, $50,094; Manhattan, 
$31,717; Queens, $44,614; and Staten Island, $10,000. Id. 
 60. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-703(2). 
 61. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-705(2)(b).  The maximum public funds are 
$3,534,300 for mayor, $2,209,900 for public advocate and comptroller, $795,300 for 
borough president, and $92,400 for City Council. Id. 
 62. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-706(3). 
 63. 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011). 
 64. See infra notes 138–37 and accompanying text. 
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disclosure of expenditures by independent entities.65  The Board 
enacted those rules in March 2012.66  The rules require those who 
make independent expenditures above a certain threshold for an 
election to any office covered by the Act to file regular disclosure 
reports, which include identifying information about the spender, the 
amount that was spent, what was purchased, and which candidate or 
candidates were mentioned in the materials financed by the 
expenditure.67  In addition, entities making independent expenditures 
of $5,000 or more must report the names of their contributors.68 
As addressed below, the increasingly narrow views espoused by 
modern courts with regard to what types of campaign finance 
regulation are permissible under the First Amendment threaten to 
diminish the efficacy of the Program’s restrictions and requirements.  
The next section will recount the relevant jurisprudence, both at the 
Supreme Court level and as pertains to New York City’s program. 
II.  EVOLVING JURISPRUDENCE 
A. Supreme Court 
The origins of modern campaign finance jurisprudence lie in 
Buckley v. Valeo,69 a challenge to certain provisions of the Federal 
Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971, as amended in 1974.70  The 
1974 amendments, passed by Congress after the Watergate scandal 
revealed pervasive financial corruption during the 1972 presidential 
campaign, imposed limits on contributions by individuals, political 
parties, and PACs; limited spending by candidates and parties for 
national conventions; closed a loophole that had allowed candidates 
to use an unlimited number of political committees for fundraising 
purposes; required reporting and disclosure of contributions and 
expenditures above a certain threshold; and established the Federal 
Election Commission (FEC) to enforce the law and oversee 
disclosure and public financing.71 
In Buckley, the Supreme Court upheld the provisions of FECA 
that limited individual contributions to campaigns and required 
 
 65. N.Y.C. CHARTER § 1052(a)(12), (15). 
 66. R.C.N.Y. tit. 52, ch. 13 (N.Y. Leg. Publ’g Co. 2012). 
 67. N.Y.C. CHARTER § 1052(a)(12), (15). 
 68. Id. 
 69. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 70. Id. at 6. 
 71. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 118–19 (2003). 
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reporting and disclosure of contributions and expenditures above a 
certain level, but struck down its limitations on expenditures by 
candidates, campaigns, and independent spenders.72  Regarding the 
contribution limit provisions, the Court held that a “contribution 
serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his 
views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the 
support,”73 and that accordingly, limitations thereon impose “only a 
marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free 
communication”74 and “do not undermine to any material degree the 
potential for robust and effective discussion of candidates and 
campaign issues by individual citizens, associations, the institutional 
press, candidates, and political parties.”75  The Court further stated 
that Congress had justifiably concluded that large monetary 
contributions to campaigns must be eliminated in pursuit of the 
interest in preventing the appearance of impropriety.76 
The Court, however, viewed expenditures in a different light than 
contributions.  Noting that “[t]he First Amendment affords the 
broadest protection to . . . political expression in order ‘to assure (the) 
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and 
social changes desired by the people,’”77 the Court effectively equated 
the expenditure of funds for political communications with the 
underlying communications themselves.78  Finding that FECA’s 
limitations on expenditures by candidates, campaigns, and 
independent spenders constituted “substantial rather than merely 
theoretical restraints on the quality and diversity of political speech,” 
the Court applied strict scrutiny and ultimately held that the 
 
 72. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 3 (1976). 
 73. Id. at 21. 
 74. Id. at 20. 
 75. Id. at 29. 
 76. Id. at 30. 
 77. Id. at 14 (quoting Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). 
 78. Id. at 19 (“A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend 
on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of 
expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their 
exploration, and the size of the audience reached.  This is because virtually every 
means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the expenditure of 
money.”); see also id. at 52–53 (“The candidate, no less than any other person, has a 
First Amendment right to engage in the discussion of public issues and vigorously 
and tirelessly to advocate his own election and the election of other candidates.  
Indeed, it is of particular importance that candidates have the unfettered opportunity 
to make their views known so that the electorate may intelligently evaluate the 
candidates’ personal qualities and their positions on vital public issues before 
choosing among them on election day.”). 
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restrictions were sufficiently burdensome that they could not be 
justified by the government interest in preventing corruption or the 
appearance thereof.79  Going further, the Court declared, “The use of 
personal funds reduces the candidate’s dependence on outside 
contributions and thereby counteracts the coercive pressures and 
attendant risks of abuse to which the Act’s contribution limits are 
directed.”80  The alternative government interest in “equalizing the 
relative financial resources of candidates competing for elective 
office” was deemed insufficient as well.81  The Court did, however, 
uphold the imposition of expenditure limits on candidates as a 
condition of acceptance of public funds.82 
Buckley’s conflation of campaign spending with political speech, 
and the implication that self-financing and independent spending 
provide immunity from corrupt influences, laid the groundwork for 
several holdings by the Roberts Court, each of which has made it 
more difficult for public financing systems to counteract the 
advantages held by self-financed candidates or those with wealthy 
independent supporters.83  Moreover, since Buckley, the Court has 
rejected all proposed justifications for campaign finance restrictions 
other than prevention of quid pro quo corruption or the appearance 
thereof, purportedly because such prevention is the only justification 
recognized by the Court.84  This presumption overlooks the particular 
circumstances underlying Buckley, wherein the anticorruption 
interest was the only one that existed.  That the 1974 FECA 
amendments were specifically addressed at targeting corruption does 
not mean that no other government interest could be sufficient to 
necessitate similar restrictions, and the Court in Buckley never stated 
or implied so.  The Roberts Court, however, has repeatedly adopted 
and applied that interpretation.85 
 
 79. Id. at 19, 44–58. 
 80. Id. at 53. 
 81. Id. at 54. 
 82. Id. at 57, n.65. 
 83. See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 
2806 (2011); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Davis v. 
Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724 (2008). 
 84. See, e.g., Bennett, 131 S. Ct. at 2826–29; Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911; 
Davis, 554 U.S. at 726. 
 85. See generally DANIEL R. ORTIZ, THE NEW CAMPAIGN FINANCE SOURCEBOOK 
ch. 3 (2005); IF BUCKLEY FELL: A FIRST AMENDMENT BLUEPRINT FOR REGULATING 
MONEY IN POLITICS, (E. Joshua Rosenkranz ed., 1999). 
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First, Davis v. Federal Election Commission struck down a 
provision of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) that 
relaxed contribution limits on candidates whose opponents’ 
expenditure of personal funds exceeded a threshold amount, 
regarding this asymmetrical scheme as a penalty against high 
spending candidates that impermissibly burdened their First 
Amendment right to political speech.86  Relying on what it called the 
“fundamental nature of the right to spend personal funds for 
campaign speech” established in Buckley,87 the Court stated that the 
provision would impose “an unprecedented penalty” on candidates 
who “robustly exercise[d]” that right.88  Under strict scrutiny, the 
existence or appearance of corruption was held insufficient to justify 
the burden, based on the Court’s reasoning in Buckley that reliance 
on personal funds reduces the threat of corruption.89  The Court 
further declined to acknowledge “level[ing] electoral opportunities 
for candidates of different personal wealth” as a legitimate 
government objective.90  The Court noted that if the increased 
contribution limits were applied “across the board,” there would be 
no basis for a challenge; the asymmetry of the scheme as applied, 
however, was deemed an impermissible burden on a self-financing 
candidate’s “First Amendment right to spend his own money for 
campaign speech.”91 
Two years later, in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission, the Court held that the BCRA’s restriction on 
independent spending by corporations was an infringement upon 
corporations’ First Amendment rights, and that the burden was not 
justified by the governmental interest in preventing the existence or 
 
 86. 554 U.S. 724, 738–39 (2008). 
 87. Id. at 738. 
 88. Id. at 739 (“[The provision] requires a candidate to choose between the First 
Amendment right to engage in unfettered political speech and subjection to 
discriminatory fundraising limitations.  Many candidates who can afford to make 
large personal expenditures to support their campaigns may choose to do so despite 
[the provision], but they must shoulder a special and potentially significant burden if 
they make that choice.”). 
 89. Id. at 740–41. 
 90. Id. at 741;see also id. (“[P]reventing corruption or the appearance of 
corruption are the only legitimate and compelling government interests thus far 
identified for restricting campaign finances.” (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Miss. Gov’t 
PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 428 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); id. (“noting ‘the interests the Court has recognized as compelling, i.e., the 
prevention of corruption or the appearance thereof’” (quoting Randall v. Sorrell, 548 
U.S. 230, 268 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment))). 
 91. Id. at 737–38 (2008). 
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appearance of corruption.92  The Court relied on Buckley’s distinction 
between contribution limits and expenditure limits, noting that the 
former “have been an accepted means to prevent quid pro quo 
corruption[,]” and opined that “independent expenditures, including 
those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the 
appearance of corruption.”93  The Court found that, “[a]s a 
‘restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on 
political communication during a campaign,’ [the BCRA] ‘necessarily 
reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues 
discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience 
reached.’”94  After determining that Citizens United, as a corporation, 
was entitled to First Amendment protection of its expenditures,95 the 
Court applied strict scrutiny and found that the “chilling effect” of 
limits on independent expenditures “extend[s] well beyond the 
Government’s interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption.”96  
Overruling McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, which had 
described limiting the government’s interest in this manner as a 
“crabbed view of corruption” which “ignores precedent, common 
sense, and the realities of political fundraising,”97 the Court held that 
“[t]he fact that speakers may have influence over or access to elected 
officials does not mean that these officials are corrupt.”98 
Most recently, Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC 
v. Bennett struck down the “trigger” provisions of Arizona’s public 
financing program, which granted supplemental matching funds to 
candidates whose self-financed opponents’ spending, combined with 
that of independent groups in support of the self-financed candidates 
 
 92. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 93. Id. at 357 (“The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an 
expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the 
expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be 
given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.” (quoting 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 
id. (“[I]ndependent expenditures have a ‘substantially diminished potential for 
abuse.’” (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47)). 
 94. Id. at 339 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19). 
 95. Id. at 342–43 (“[P]olitical speech does not lose First Amendment protection 
‘simply because its source is a corporation.’ . . .  The Court has thus rejected the 
argument that political speech of corporations or other associations should be treated 
differently under the First Amendment simply because such associations are not 
‘natural persons.’” (internal citations omitted)). 
 96. Id. at 357. 
 97. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 152 (2003). 
 98. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359. 
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or in opposition to their opponents, exceeded the amount of public 
funds initially allotted to publicly financed candidates.99  Relying on 
Davis, the Court found that although such provisions do not prohibit 
self-financed candidates from spending at a high level, they force such 
candidates to “shoulder a special and potentially significant burden if 
they make that choice.”100  A public financing scheme may not punish 
candidates for the “vigorous exercise of the right to use personal 
funds to finance campaign speech.”101  The Court acknowledged that, 
as stated in the dissenting opinion, it has never held a “viewpoint-
neutral subsidy given to one speaker to constitute a First Amendment 
burden on another”; it noted, however, that none of the previously 
upheld subsidies had been “given in direct response to the political 
speech of another, to allow the recipient to counter that speech.”102  
The Court further emphasized that it was this trigger component of 
the system, rather than the amount of money provided to publicly 
financed candidates, that made the program problematic.103  Rejecting 
the state’s argument that the provision ultimately created more 
speech rather than hindering it, the Court responded that any 
resulting increase in speech by publicly financed candidates would 
come “at the expense of impermissibly burdening (and thus reducing) 
the speech of privately financed candidates and independent 
expenditure groups.”104 
Having ruled that the trigger provisions constituted an undue 
burden under the First Amendment, the Court turned to the question 
of whether the burden was justified by a compelling state interest.105  
“Leveling the playing field” was, again, dismissed as such a 
justification.106  Reiterating the conclusions reached in Buckley and 
Davis, the Court also rejected the concept of limiting expenditures by 
candidates or independent entities as a way to reduce the existence or 
appearance of corruption.107  Finally, the Court rejected the state’s 
 
 99. 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2813 (2011). 
 100. Id. at 2823 (quoting Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 739 (2008)). 
 101. Id. at 2818 (quoting Davis, 554 U.S. at 739). 
 102. Id. at 2822. 
 103. Id. at 2824. 
 104. Id. at 2820–21. 
 105. Id. at 2825–28. 
 106. Id. at 2825 (“We have repeatedly rejected the argument that the government 
has a compelling state interest in ‘leveling the playing field’ that can justify undue 
burdens on political speech.”). 
 107. “Burdening a candidate’s expenditure of his own funds on his own campaign 
does not further the State’s anticorruption interest.  Indeed, we have said that 
LOPREST & PERSKIE_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2013  7:22 PM 
654 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
suggestion that the provisions could reduce corruption or the 
appearance thereof by encouraging candidates to participate in the 
public financing program.108  The Court did acknowledge that public 
financing of campaigns could further “‘significant governmental 
interest[s],’ such as the state interest in preventing corruption,” but 
reiterated that public financing schemes must be administered “in a 
manner consistent with the First Amendment.”109 
Opponents of campaign finance regulation have relied upon these 
recent court rulings in challenging existing public financing schemes, 
including, as discussed in the next section, that of New York City. 
B. Judicial Challenges to the New York City Program 
In 2009, several candidates for New York City office, lobbyists, and 
other interested parties sought a judgment declaring certain 
provisions of the Act to be unconstitutional.110  Specifically, the 
plaintiffs objected to the Act’s “pay to play” rules, pursuant to which 
no candidate for New York City office may receive contributions 
from a corporation, limited liability company (LLC), or partnership.111  
The “pay to play” rules also subject contributions from individuals or 
entities doing business with the city to a reduced per-contributor limit 
and prohibit those contributions from being matched with public 
funds.112  Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bennett, the parties 
entered into an agreement stipulating that the Act’s “bonus 
provisions,” which had provided for additional public funds to be 
awarded to participating candidates opposed by non-participants who 
 
‘reliance on personal funds reduces the threat of corruption’ and that ‘discouraging 
[the] use of personal funds[ ] disserves the anticorruption interest.’” Id. at 2826 
(quoting Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 740–41 (2008)).  “That is 
because ‘the use of personal funds reduces the candidate’s dependence on outside 
contributions and thereby counteracts the coercive pressures and attendant risks of 
abuse’ of money in politics.” Id. (quoting Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 
724, 740–41 (2008); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 53 (1976)).  “The matching funds 
provision counts a candidate’s expenditures of his own money on his own campaign 
as contributions, and to that extent cannot be supported by any anticorruption 
interest.” Id. 
 108. Id. at 2827 (“[T]he fact that burdening constitutionally protected speech might 
indirectly serve the State’s anticorruption interest, by encouraging candidates to take 
public financing, does not establish the constitutionality of the matching funds 
provision.”). 
 109. Id. at 2828 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57 n.65). 
 110. Ognibene v. Parkes, 599 F. Supp. 2d 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 111. Id. at 437–38; see also N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3-702(3), 3-703(1)(a)–(b), (l) 
(2012). 
 112. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3-702(3), 3-703(1)(a)–(b), (l). 
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spent above a certain threshold, were unconstitutional and would not 
be enforced.113  However, the Second Circuit upheld the pay to play 
rules when it determined that the rules were “closely drawn to 
address the significant governmental interest in reducing corruption 
or the appearance thereof.”114  A petition for certiorari was filed in 
the Supreme Court on March 19, 2012, but the Court declined to hear 
the case, allowing the circuit court’s ruling to stand.115 
The Second Circuit cited Buckley and Davis for the proposition 
that contribution limits and prohibitions are acceptable provided that 
they are “closely drawn to address a sufficient state interest,” while 
noting the Supreme Court’s consistent acknowledgement of 
“preventing actual and perceived corruption” as a sufficient 
interest.116  The court found that the Act’s “doing business” limits fell 
outside the scope of Citizens United because they concern 
contributions rather than expenditures; they are limits rather than 
prohibitions; and they address the appearance of corruption, rather 
than the appearance of influence.117  Because the “doing business” 
limits “are only indirect constraints on protected speech and 
associational rights,” the court subjected them to the “closely drawn” 
standard of review rather than strict scrutiny118 and held that the limits 
were properly designed to prevent the perception of corruption.119  
With regard to the prohibition on matching funds for contributions 
from individuals or entities doing business with the city, the court 
found the provision more analogous to a limit than a ban, noting that 
“[n]on-matching does not prevent someone from making a 
 
 113. Order Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) Regarding New York City 
Administrative Code §§ 3-706(3)(a)(ii), 3-706(3)(a)(iii), 3-706(3)(b)(ii), & 3-
706(3)(b)(iii), Ognibene v. Parkes, No. 08-CV-1335(LTS)(THK) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 
2011). 
 114. Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 28 
(2012). 
 115. Ognibene v. Parkes, 133 S. Ct. 28 (2012) (mem.). 
 116. Ognibene, 671 F.3d at 183 (“It is not necessary to produce evidence of actual 
corruption to demonstrate the sufficiently important interest in preventing the 
appearance of corruption.” (citations omitted)). 
 117. Id. at 185–86. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 187 (“When those who do business with the government or lobby for 
various interests give disproportionately large contributions to incumbents, 
regardless of their ideological positions, it is no wonder that the perception arises that 
the contributions are made with the hope or expectation that the donors will receive 
contracts and other favors in exchange for these contributions. The threat of quid pro 
quo corruption in such cases is common sense and far from illusory.”). 
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contribution, but it does minimize the value of the contribution.”120  
The court thus applied the less stringent standard of review and held 
that the non-matching provision was also closely drawn to address a 
sufficiently important government interest.121 
The corporation provision, however, is a prohibition rather than a 
limit and is therefore subject to a stricter standard.122  The court 
referred to the four justifications that the Supreme Court recognized 
for the federal ban on corporate contributions, including “the anti-
corruption interest already discussed,”123 which the court found to 
apply to LLCs, limited liability partnerships (LLPs), and partnerships, 
just as it did to corporations, noting that “the organizational form of 
an LLC, LLP, and partnership, like a corporation, creates the 
opportunity for an individual donor to circumvent valid contribution 
limits.”124  The court thus held that the extension of the entity ban to 
cover LLCs and partnerships in addition to corporations was closely 
drawn because “the legal distinctions between [LLCs, LLPs, and 
partnerships] and corporations do not make them less of a threat of 
corruption or circumvention.”125 
The plaintiffs in Ognibene also challenged the Act’s so-called “sure 
winner” and “expenditure limit relief” provisions in a motion for 
partial summary judgment.126  The sure winner provision reduces the 
maximum amount of matching funds available to participants unless 
their opponents have either raised, spent, or contracted to spend, 
more than twenty percent of the applicable expenditure limit.127  A 
participant who wishes to receive a full payment of public funds may 
also submit a Statement of Need with accompanying documentation 
verifying that his or her opponent satisfies at least one of seven 
indicia that the opponent will constitute a legitimate challenge.128  The 
 
 120. Id. at 193. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 194–95. 
 123. Id. at 194–95 (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 154 
(2003)). 
 124. Id. at 195 (citations omitted). 
 125. Id. at 195–97. 
 126. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, Ognibene v. Parkes, No. 08 Civ. 1335(LTS)(FM), 2013 WL 
1348462 (S.D.N.Y Apr. 4, 2013). 
 127. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-705(7)(a) (2012); Ognibene v. Parkes, No. 08 
Civ. 1335(LTS)(FM), 2013 WL 1348462, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2013).]. 
 128. The conditions include: (1) a non-participating candidate or a limited 
participating candidate who has the ability to self-finance; (2) a candidate who has 
received endorsements from specified high-profile individuals or entities; (3) a 
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purpose of this provision is to conserve taxpayer dollars by preventing 
the award of maximum public funds to candidates who face minimal 
opposition.129  The expenditure limit relief provision increases the 
spending limit for participating candidates opposed by non-
participants who have raised or spent more than half the applicable 
expenditure limit; if a non-participant raises or spends more than 
three times the expenditure limit, the limit on his or her participating 
opponent’s spending is removed entirely.130  This provision was 
intended to reduce the burden imposed by the Program’s expenditure 
limits on participants whose opponents are not bound by such limits. 
The plaintiffs likened the sure winner and expenditure limit relief 
provisions to the trigger provisions struck down in Davis and 
Bennett.131  The defendants filed a cross-motion for partial summary 
judgment, arguing that rather than awarding additional funds to a 
candidate in response to spending by his or her opponent or creating 
an asymmetrical funding scheme, the sure winner provision “simply 
preserves the public fisc by minimizing public financing of 
participating candidates in non-competitive races,” and the 
expenditure limit relief provision, “if anything, restores symmetry by 
first raising, and then removing, expenditure limits asymmetrically 
imposed by the Program upon participating candidates but not upon 
their nonparticipating opponents.”132   
On April 4, 2013, the court upheld the expenditure limit relief 
provisions because, unlike the scheme struck down in Bennett, they 
 
candidate who has had significant media exposure in the twelve months preceding 
the election; (4) a candidate who has received 25 percent or more of the vote in an 
election within the last eight years for an office in an area that overlaps with the area 
that is the subject of the current election; (5) a candidate whose name is substantially 
similar to the candidate’s so as to result in confusion among voters; (6) a candidate 
who is a chairman, president, or district manager of a community board (city council 
or borough-wide races only); and (7) a candidate whose immediate family member 
holds or has held elective office in all or part of the covered area in the past ten years. 
See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §3-705(7)(b). 
 129. Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment & in Support of Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 5, Ognibene v. Parkes, No. 08 Civ. 1335(LTS)(FM), 2013 WL 1348462 
(S.D.N.Y Apr. 4, 2013). 
 130. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-706(3)(b)(i). 
 131. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, Ognibene v. Parkes, No. 08 Civ. 1335(LTS)(FM), 2013 WL 
1348462 (S.D.N.Y Apr. 4, 2013). 
 132. Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment & in Support of Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 2, Ognibene v. Parkes, No. 08 Civ. 1335(LTS)(FM), 2013 WL 1348462 
(S.D.N.Y Apr. 4, 2013). 
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“do not put non-participating candidates to the choice of refraining 
from speech or causing their participating opponents to receive direct 
infusions of public money.”133  With regard to the “circumstantial 
trigger” component of the sure winner provisions, which increases a 
participant’s eligibility for public funds upon the submission of a 
Statement of Need identifying indicia that the participant’s opponent 
constitutes a legitimate challenge,134 the court held that no substantial 
First Amendment burden existed.135  The court held, however, that 
the “monetary triggering” component of the sure winner provisions 
was an undue burden on the First Amendment rights of candidates, 
and that the provisions could not be justified by the government’s 
interest in preventing corruption or the appearance thereof.136  
Accordingly, for all elections beginning in 2013, the Board will 
require a Statement of Need from any participant seeking to be 
eligible for the maximum amount of public funds, regardless of the 
level of spending and fundraising by that candidate’s opponent or 
opponents.137  
As discussed below, these holdings by the Supreme Court and by 
lower courts have created barriers to the enforcement of restrictions 
on campaign finance, thus enabling wealthy candidates and 
independent spenders to influence elections more than ever before. 
III.  IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT HOLDINGS ON CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE 
A. High Spending Candidates 
Wealthy individuals who run for office have always enjoyed a built-
in advantage, which was magnified when spending limits were 
 
 133. Ognibene v. Parkes, No. 08 Civ. 1335(LTS)(FM), 2013 WL 1348462, at *6 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2013). 
 134. See infra note 170 and accompanying text. 
 135. Ognibene, 2013 WL 1348462, at *10–11. 
 136. Id. at *8–10; see also id. at *10 (“[T]he fact that burdening constitutionally 
protected speech might indirectly serve the State's anticorruption interest, by 
encouraging candidates to take public financing, does not establish the 
constitutionality of the matching funds provision.” (quoting Bennett, 131 S. Ct. at 
2827); id. (“[T]he fact that the State may feel that the matching funds provision is 
necessary to allow it to ‘find[ ] the sweet-spot’ and ‘fine-tun[e]’ its public funding 
system, to achieve its desired level of participation without an undue drain on public 
resources, is not a sufficient justification for the burden.” (quoting Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 
at 2827)). 
 137. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-705(7)(b) (2012). 
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deemed impermissible.  As Justice Stevens wrote in his dissent in 
Randall v. Sorrell, 
When campaign costs are so high that only the rich have the reach to 
throw their hats into the ring, we fail to protect the political process 
from undue influence of large aggregations of capital and to 
promote individual responsibility for democratic government.  
States have recognized this problem, but Buckley’s perceived ban on 
expenditure limits severely limits their options in dealing with it.138 
Despite widespread and well-publicized concerns over Citizens 
United, high spending by independently wealthy candidates is 
nothing new.  Candidates in every election since the CFB’s first 
election in 1989139 have run against high spending non-participants.  
However, over the course of the CFB’s history, high spending non-
participants have run in fewer than ten percent of covered elections.140  
Most of these have been City Council races, and most involved an 
incumbent (whether participant or non-participant) who was 
reelected.141 
The goal of the Program is not to match non-participants’ spending 
with public funds, but rather to provide participating candidates with 
sufficient resources to get their message out to the voters.  The 
clearest example of this has been the past three mayoral elections.  
Michael Bloomberg, the billionaire founder and chief executive 
officer of Bloomberg L.P., has spent approximately $266 million on 
his three campaigns for mayor.142  Each of his general election 
 
 138. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 278 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 139. In 1989, Ronald Lauder ran as a nonparticipant in the Republican primary 
against Rudolph Giuliani and was defeated although Lauder spent approximately $13 
million of his own money. See N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., THE IMPACT OF HIGH-
SPENDING NON-PARTICIPANTS ON THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE PROGRAM 3 (2006), 
available at http://www.nyccfb.info/PDF/issue_reports/High-Spending-White-
Paper.pdf. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 8–9.  From 1997 to 2005, there were twenty-eight races with a high-
spending non-participant.  Of these, twenty-four were City Council races.  
Incumbents won in fifteen out sixteen of these races.  In the other eight, four 
participants won and four non-participants won. Id. 
 142. In 2001, Bloomberg spent $73.9 million; in 2005, he spent $84.6 million. See id. 
at 10.  In 2009, he spent $108 million. See N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., NEW YORKERS 
MAKE THEIR VOICES HEARD: A REPORT ON THE 2009 ELECTIONS 8 (2010) 
[hereinafter N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., REPORT ON 2009 ELECTIONS], available at 
http://www.nyccfb.info/PDF/per/2009_PER/2009PostElectionReport.pdf. 
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opponents was a participant in the Program.143  After the 2001 
election, many believed that the Program was in trouble based on the 
wide discrepancy in campaign spending by the mayoral candidates 
(Bloomberg spent $73.9 million to Mark Green’s $16.2 million).144  
The margin of victory, however, was very small—only 35,000 votes.145  
Former CFB Chairman Father Joseph A. O’Hare, S.J. commented, 
“in [the Green campaign’s] view, a swing of only 35,000 votes, 
presumably, would have spelled success for the Program.”146  In 
subsequent elections, the spending disparity grew, but the margins of 
victory demonstrate that, due to the Program, the participating 
candidate continued to be able to get his message out.  In 2009, Bill 
Thompson was outspent by almost $100 million (Thompson spent 
$9.3 million, Bloomberg $108.3 million), but lost the election by only 
about 50,000 votes, or five percent.147  Tom Robbins of The Village 
Voice stated that the election was “an absolutely amazing failure of 
big money in a campaign.”148 
However, both Green and Thompson received significant 
additional public funds when facing Bloomberg—additional public 
funds that are no longer available after the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Bennett because they were received pursuant to the Act’s “trigger” 
provisions.149  Further, the runaway spending at the federal level by 
independent actors creates cause for alarm about the potential for 
elections to become the purview of only the richest or those with the 
richest friends.  The Supreme Court has declared that providing 
 
 143. See N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., REPORT ON 2009 ELECTIONS, supra note 142, 
at 8; N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., PUBLIC DOLLARS FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD: A 
REPORT ON THE 2005 ELECTIONS 13–17 (2006), available at 
http://www.nyccfb.info/PDF/per/2005_PER/2005_Post_Election_Report.pdf; N.Y.C. 
CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., REPORT ON 2001 ELECTIONS, supra note 16, at 25–29. 
 144. See N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., REPORT ON 2001 ELECTIONS, supra note 16, 
at xiii, 5. 
 145. N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., REPORT ON 2009 ELECTIONS, supra note 142, at 
11. 
 146. See N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., REPORT ON 2001 ELECTIONS, supra note 16, 
at xiii. 
 147. N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., REPORT ON 2009 ELECTIONS, supra note 142, at 8. 
 148. Election Day 2009: GOPers Sweep Governor Races; Bloomberg Wins Tight 
NYC Mayoral Race; Dems Take House Seats; Maine Repeals Gay Marriage, 
DEMOCRACY NOW! (Nov. 4, 2009), http://www.democracynow.org/2009/ 
11/4/election_day_2009_gopers_sweep_governor. 
 149. See Order Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) Regarding New York City 
Administrative Code §§ 3-706(3)(a)(ii), 3-706(3)(a)(iii), 3-706(3)(b)(ii), & 3-
706(3)(b)(iii), Ognibene v. Parkes, No. 08-CV-1335(LTS)(THK) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 
2011). 
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electoral opportunity is not a sufficient justification for limiting the 
free speech rights of other candidates.150  At some point, however, 
Justice Stevens’s concerns ring true, and there is a need for balance. 
B. Independent Expenditures 
In addition to exacerbating the dichotomy between rich and poor 
candidates, the evolution of campaign finance jurisprudence has 
vastly increased the degree to which high spending independent 
groups can attempt to influence the outcome of elections.  The impact 
of Citizens United has been immediate and tangible, with 
independent groups and their often anonymous donors poised to 
dominate the field of political speech. 
Shortly after Citizens United was decided, the D.C. Circuit Court 
heard a case brought by SpeechNow, an advocacy group funded in 
part by unaffiliated donors, which planned to produce and broadcast 
political advertisements during the 2010 election cycle.151  SpeechNow 
had requested an advisory opinion from the FEC to determine 
whether it must register as a political committee and whether 
donations it received would be considered “contributions” and thus 
be subject to federal limits.152  The FEC issued a draft advisory 
opinion answering both questions in the affirmative, which prompted 
SpeechNow, along with five individual plaintiffs, to seek an injunction 
barring the FEC from enforcing contribution limits with respect to 
donations given to SpeechNow.153  After eliminating all the 
government interests previously rejected by the Supreme Court as 
insufficient to justify restrictions on political contributions, the court 
reiterated that only “the government’s anticorruption interest” could 
provide such a justification, and, relying on Citizens United, held that 
“the government has no anticorruption interest in limiting 
independent expenditures.”154  Applying that logic, the court 
concluded, “contributions to groups that make only independent 
expenditures also cannot corrupt or create the appearance of 
 
 150. See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 
2806, 2825 (2011). 
 151. SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686, 689–90 (D.C. Cir. 
2010). 
 152. Id. at 689. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 692–93 (emphasis in original). 
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corruption.”155  Accordingly, donations made to independent spenders 
were held not to be subject to contribution limits. 
In the wake of Citizens United and SpeechNow, independent 
groups, including so-called “super PACs,” can both raise and spend 
money in unlimited quantities.  In 2010, independent expenditures for 
candidates in the federal midterm elections quadrupled the amount 
spent by outside groups in 2006.156  Moreover, the percentage of 
spending by groups that were not required to disclose their donors, 
such as 501(c)(4) nonprofit organizations, increased from 1% in 2006 
to 47% four years later.157  Independent spending in the Republican 
presidential primaries from January 1 to 25, 2012, increased more 
than 1600% from the same period in 2008, and 44% of all ads aired 
during that time were funded by outside interest groups, compared 
with 3% in the 2008 primaries.158  The groups making these 
expenditures rely heavily on large donations; 93% of super PAC 
funds raised in 2011 came from contributions of $10,000 or more.159 
State and local elections have likewise seen a drastic increase in 
independent expenditures.  In Arizona, which provides public 
financing to candidates for state office, outside spending on state 
elections more than doubled between 2006 and 2010.160  During the 
same period, independent spending in North Carolina rose 468%,161 
and in Iowa, it increased by a factor of twenty-eight.162  In San 
Francisco, a city with a public financing program similar to New 
 
 155. Id. at 694. 
 156. Spencer MacColl, Citizens United Decision Profoundly Affects Political 
Landscape, OPEN SECRETS BLOG (May 5, 2011, 11:16 AM), 
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/05/citizens-united-decision-profoundly-affects-
political-landscape.html. 
 157. See id. 
 158. Erika Franklin Fowler, Outside Group Involvement in GOP Contest 
Skyrockets Compared to 2008, WESLEYAN MEDIA PROJECT BLOG (Jan. 30, 2012), 
http://mediaproject.wesleyan.edu/2012/01/30/group-involvement-skyrockets. 
 159. Blair Bowie & Adam Lioz, Auctioning Democracy: The Rise of Super PACs 
and the 2012 Election, WESLEYAN MEDIA PROJECT BLOG (Feb. 8, 2012), 
http://www.demos.org/publication/auctioning-democracy-rise-super-pacs-and-2012-
election. 
 160. Independent Spending in Arizona, 2006–2010, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY ST. 
POL. (Aug. 12, 2011), http://www.followthemoney.org/press/ 
ReportView.phtml?r=456. 
 161. Independent Spending in North Carolina, 2006-2010, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY 
ST. POL. (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.followthemoney.org/press/ 
ReportView.phtml?r=472). 
 162. Independent Spending in Iowa, 2006-2010, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY ST. POL. 
(Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.followthemoney.org/press/ReportView.phtml?r=464. 
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York’s, independent spending in the 2011 mayoral election totaled 
nearly $2.6 million,163 compared with less than $30,000 four years 
earlier.164  This level of outside spending dramatically increases the 
potential for the appearance of undue influence.  One news report 
stated that the independent spenders in San Francisco’s mayoral 
election included “[b]usinesspeople with financial stakes in city 
contracts, real-estate professionals involved in major development 
projects, and investors in San Francisco companies who stand to 
benefit from specialized tax breaks.”165 
In addition to a lack of financial regulation, interest groups seeking 
to influence federal elections have benefited from the FEC’s lenient 
interpretation of the concept of coordination, allowing campaigns and 
outside groups to engage in cooperated efforts disguised as 
independent spending in order to circumvent contribution limits.166  
The founder of one super PAC aimed at defeating Suzan DelBene’s 
2012 congressional campaign was the mother of DelBene’s opponent, 
Laura Ruderman.167  When asked about the super PAC, Ruderman 
claimed that she was “just as surprised as everyone else” to learn of 
its origins, as well as the $115,000 expenditure her mother’s 
organization had made on her behalf.168 
Pursuant to FEC regulations, a “communication is coordinated 
with a candidate, an authorized committee, a political party 
committee, or an agent of any of the foregoing when the 
communication . . . [i]s paid for, in whole or in part, by a person other 
than that candidate, authorized committee, or political party 
committee,” and satisfies certain standards of content and conduct.169  
The conduct standards, used to determine whether there is 
“agreement or formal collaboration” between a campaign and an 
independent spender, include a “[r]equest or suggestion” made by a 
 
 163. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., DISCLOSURE OF INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES IN NEW 
YORK CITY ELECTIONS 5 (2012). 
 164. SAN FRANCISCO ETHICS COMMISSION, 2007 MAYORAL PUBLIC FINANCING 
PROGRAM AND A FEASIBILITY AND COSTS STUDY OF A FULL PUBLIC FINANCING 
PROGRAM 6 (2008). 
 165. Rebecca Bowe, The Billionaire’s Mayor, S.F. BAY GUARDIAN (Oct. 18, 2011). 
 166. See, e.g., UPDATE: Anti-Suzan DelBene PAC Funded by Mother of 
Opponent Laura Ruderman, SEATTLE TIMES (July 15, 2012, 11:05 AM), 
http://blogs.seattletimes.com/politicsnorthwest/2012/07/15/anti-suzan-delbene-pac-
funded-by-mother-of-opponent-laura-ruderman/. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(a) (2013). 
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candidate or his or her authorized committee or political party 
committee regarding the communication in question; “material 
involvement” by the candidate or his or her committees in decisions 
regarding certain aspects of the communication; “[s]ubstantial 
discussion” between the individual or entity sponsoring the 
communication, or his or her employees or agents, and the candidate 
who is clearly identified in the committee or his or her committees or 
opponent; a “[c]ommon vendor” shared by the candidate and the 
independent spender, where such vendor is contracted or employed 
for the creation, production, or distribution of the communication; 
and a “[f]ormer employee or independent contractor” of the 
candidate or his or her committees who either pays for the 
communication or conveys certain types of information to the 
communication’s sponsor.170 
The practical application of these regulations by the FEC has 
created massive loopholes in terms of what constitutes coordination 
of purportedly independent expenditures.171  In one high-profile 
example, the Commission deadlocked 3-3 on the decision of whether 
a series of advertisements sponsored by American Crossroads 
advocating for the reelection of certain incumbent members of 
Congress would constitute coordinated communications.172  
Incredibly, American Crossroads’ own acknowledgment that the 
advertisements in question “would be fully coordinated with 
incumbent Members of Congress . . . insofar as each Member would 
be consulted on the advertisement script and would then appear in 
the advertisement”173 did not, in the estimation of three of the FEC 
commissioners, resolve the issue of whether the ads were 
coordinated. 
New York City has also begun to see an increase in independent 
spending.  In the weeks before the 2009 elections, the 
Communications Workers of America, Local 1180 ran a television 
commercial opposing Michael Bloomberg.174  Although the ad did not 
mention Bloomberg’s opponent, Bill Thompson, or even directly urge 
 
 170. 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(d) (2013). 
 171. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion Request from Am. Crossroads to Fed. Election 
Comm’n, AOR 2011-23 (Oct. 28, 2011). 
 172. Certification, American Crossroads, AO 2011-23 (F.E.C. Dec. 5, 2011). 
 173. Advisory Opinion Request from Am. Crossroads to Fed. Election Comm’n, 
AOR 2011-23 (Oct. 28, 2011). 
 174. N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., DISCLOSURE OF INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES IN 
NEW YORK CITY ELECTIONS 9 (2012), available at http://www.nyccfb.info/pdf/ 
issue_reports/disclosure-of-independent-expenditures-in-nyc-elections.pdf. 
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a vote against Bloomberg, its electioneering tagline was clear: “Tell 
Republican Michael Bloomberg: NYC is not for sale.”175  Further, in 
the 2009 elections, the Independence Party, with funding from real 
estate interests, spent significant amounts in four City Council races 
in which the progressive Working Families Party supported 
Bloomberg’s opponents.176  These examples and others were the fuel 
that led to the Board’s recommendation that disclosure be required of 
independent spenders in New York City elections, and to the passage 
of the Charter amendment authorizing the Board to require such 
disclosure.177 
IV.  SMALL DONOR DEMOCRACY 
Presuming that we don’t want to be left with the specter raised by 
Justice Stevens—a system in which only a limited number of people 
have the wherewithal to run for even the lowest elected office—what 
can be done to combat the increase in spending by self-financed 
candidates and outside actors?  The Supreme Court has cut off 
permissible methods for governments to assist candidates faced with 
either high spending opponents or independent spenders.  Therefore, 
there needs to be a new way to solve these problems.  As stated by 
the Campaign Finance Institute (“CFI”) in a 2001 report, 
[t]he requirement is to use policy methods [that] do not restrict or 
inhibit speech.  It is both constitutional and perfectly appropriate to 
promote participation by building up instead of squeezing down—to 
dilute the power of the few by increasing the number and 
importance of low-dollar donors and volunteers.178 
After the 2008 presidential election, it was widely believed that the 
use of technology to mobilize small donors could be sufficient to elicit 
campaign participation in large numbers.179  The Internet eliminates 
many of the barriers to reaching potential contributors and voters in a 
 
 175. Id. 
 176. See N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., REPORT ON 2009 ELECTIONS, supra note 142, 
at 170–71. 
 177. See id. at 180–81. 
 178. MICHAEL J. MALBIN ET AL., CAMPAIGN FIN. INST., CHANGING THE GAME BY 
EXPANDING THE PLAYING FIELD: PUBLIC FINANCING OF ELECTIONS AFTER CITIZENS 
UNITED AND ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE 1 (2011) (emphasis omitted), available at 
http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/state/CFI_Report_Small-Donors-in-Six-Midwestern-States-
2July2011.pdf. 
 179. See, e.g., MIGALLY & LISS, supra note 19, at 24. 
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cost-effective fashion.180  The success of President Obama’s 2008 
campaign in using the Internet to reach contributors was inspiring.181  
Even Obama’s 2008 campaign, however, raised most of its funds 
through larger donations.182  Hence, relying on the Internet as a sole 
method of increasing participation may not be sustainable. 
One way to increase participation by individuals is through the use 
of small donor matching funds programs, like New York City’s.  The 
Program, with its multiple match of six dollars for every dollar 
contributed by a New York City resident up to a maximum amount, is 
viewed as a model to encourage this type of participation.183  The 
Supreme Court has endorsed public financing as a method of building 
public participation in the political process.184  As New York State has 
considered adopting its own public financing system, the City’s 
program has been lauded as an example for the state to follow.185 
One of the primary objectives of the small dollar multiple match 
program is to empower New York City voters to be more engaged in 
 
 180. ANTHONY J. CORRADO ET AL., JOINT PROJECT CAMPAIGN FIN. INST., AM. 
ENTER. INST., BROOKINGS INST., REFORM IN AN AGE OF NETWORKED CAMPAIGNS: 
HOW TO FOSTER CITIZEN PARTICIPATION THROUGH SMALL DONORS AND 
VOLUNTEERS 10 (2010), available at http://www.cfinst.org/books_reports/Reform-in-
an-Age-of-Networked-Campaigns.pdf. 
 181. See id. at 12. 
 182. CAMPAIGN FIN. INST., CFI ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES’ DONOR 
REPORTS (2008), available at http://www.cfinst.org/press/preleases/08-11-
24/Realty_Check_-_Obama_Small_Donors.aspx. 
 183. See, e.g., Editorial, Give Small Political Donors a Voice, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 
2012, at A24; Alec Hamilton, Campaign Finance Ruling May Make NYC a Model for 
the Nation, WNYC (June 21, 2011), http://www.wnyc.org/articles/its-free-
country/2011/jun/21/campaign-finance-ruling-may-make-new-york-model-nation. 
 184. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92–93 (1976) (“[Public financing] is a 
congressional effort not to abridge, restrict, or censor speech, but rather to use public 
money to facilitate and enlarge public discussion and participation in the electoral 
process, goals vital to a self-governing people.”). 
 185. See, e.g., Thomas Kaplan, Wealthy Group Seeks to Reform Election Giving 
in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/12/ 
nyregion/coalition-urges-public-financing-in-new-york-state-elections.html; Bill 
Mahoney, Campaign Finance Reform: What’s Needed Besides Public Financing?, 
GOTHAM GAZETTE (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/ 
component/content/article/86-elections/1431-campaign-finance-reform-whats-
needed-besides-public-financing; Sundeep Iyer & Michael Malbic, Reform Campaign 
Finance, Give All Residents a Voice, J. NEWS, July 17, 2012, available at 
http://nylead.org/2012/07/25/journal-news-opinion-reform-campaign-finance-give-all-
residents-a-voice; Press Release, N.Y. Leadership for Accountable Gov’t, NY LEAD 
Calls for Campaign Finance Reform for NYS to Restore Fairness in Elections (Feb. 
15, 2012), available at http://nylead.org/2012/02/15/ny-lead-calls-for-campaign-
finance-reform-for-nys-to-restore-fairness-in-elections. 
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the political system.186  Among the Program’s goals is encouraging 
New Yorkers to become more engaged by giving small contributions, 
while also incentivizing candidates to seek those small contributions 
from the voters.  As stated in the CFB’s 2009 post-election report:   
Raising funds from a broad range of small donors, rather than a 
narrow band of wealthy donors, gives candidates access to a wider 
range of perspectives on city issues.  At the same time, candidates 
who work to cultivate small contributors are helping to create a 
more active class of supporters . . . .187 
By these measures, the multiple match program has been very 
successful.  In the 2009 elections, 68.9% of all contributors gave $175 
or less, compared with 58.5% in 2001 and 56.5% in 2005.188  Although 
the total amount of money coming from small donations remains low, 
the percentage of total dollar contributions in small amounts has also 
increased over time.  In 2009, 14.8% of all funds raised came from 
contributions of $175 or less, compared with 10% in 2001 and 8.5% in 
2005.189  Even more encouraging is that many of these small donors 
are new contributors, having given for the first time in the 2009 
election.  More than half of all the New York City contributors in the 
past three citywide elections have been first-time donors.  These first-
time donors are also likely to be small contributors; 80% of new 
donors in 2009 contributed $175 or less.190 
After conducting a study of the small donor issue in New York City 
for the 2005 and 2009 elections, the CFI found that “multiple 
matching funds sharply increase the proportional role of small 
donors; . . . increase[] the number of people who contribute; and . . . 
shift[] the demographic and class profile of those who give, making 
the system more representative of the population as a whole.”191  The 
study found that 37% of the funds that City Council candidates 
received in 2005 and 2009 came from individuals whose contributions 
aggregated to less than $251.192  When the public funds associated 
 
 186. See, e.g., MIGALLY & LISS, supra note 19, at 11–13. 
 187. N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., REPORT ON 2009 ELECTIONS, supra note 142, at 
103. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 102–05. 
 191. Michael J. Malbin et al., Small Donors, Big Democracy: New York City’s 
Matching Funds as a Model for the Nation and States, 11 ELECTION L.J. 3, 4 (2012). 
 192. Id. at 8 tbl.1. 
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with those contributions were added, the percentage jumped to 
64%.193 
The CFI further concluded that only 9% of contributions to non-
participants in 2005 were in the amount of $250 or less; in 2009, it was 
only 15%.  Both figures were much lower than the percentage of 
small donors to participants in the Program.194  Anecdotally, City 
Councilmember Mark Weprin, who spent fifteen years as a state 
assemblyman and was a participant in the Program in 2009, recounts 
that he focused his fundraising on small donors, and attributes that 
focus to the multiple match program, unlike his previous campaign 
for state office.  His average contribution was just $240, despite his 
ability to raise much larger contributions.195 
The CFI also found that although some of the increase in small 
donors could be explained by large donors spreading their money 
around, there also was an empirically measurable increase in 
participation.196  “The 2009 election . . . saw a 55 percent increase in 
the number of donor-to-candidate pairs below $175.  This clearly was 
a substantial increase in participation and not simply reshuffling of 
old money.”197  This increase can certainly be explained by the 
legislative change between 2005 and 2009, which raised the matching 
factor from four to six; this effect on participation was the exact 
purpose of the matching rate increase.  The increase in contributor 
participation occurred notwithstanding a decline in voter turnout 
during the same period, from 33% in 2005 to 26% in 2009.198 
Further, these increasing numbers of small donors have made the 
donor pool more diverse, both geographically and demographically.199  
In 2009, 89% of the City’s census bloc groups had at least one 
 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 10. 
 195. MIGALLY & LISS, supra note 19, at 14. 
 196. Malbin et al., supra note 191, at 10.  CFI tested the “reshuffling” theory by 
looking at contributions given at exactly the largest contribution eligible for matching 
funds.  In 2005, this was $250 and in 2009, it was $175.  The surmise was that strategic 
donors would give exactly at that maximum. See id. 
 197. Id. at 12. 
 198. Id. 
 199. See generally ELISABETH GENN ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE & 
CAMPAIGN FIN. INST., DONOR DIVERSITY THROUGH PUBLIC MATCHING FUNDS 
(2012), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/ 
publications/DonorDiversityReport_WEB.PDF. 
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donor.200  Most of the donations of $1,000 or more to both city and 
state candidates came from the Upper East Side and Upper West 
Side of Manhattan.201  Research shows that “candidates for City 
Council are searching for and finding small donors in every corner of 
the city.”202  These contributors are also more demographically 
representative of the entire city, in terms of both racial and economic 
characteristics.203 
Another benefit of this increase in small donors is that candidates 
are connecting with their constituents, using fundraising to build 
volunteer and voter outreach.204  One candidate commented: “Under 
the NYC system, candidates are incentivized to build networks of 
small donors who become networks of organizers.  The most cost-
effective fundraising and the most persuasive organizing takes place 
at the same spot: in supporters’ living rooms.”205 
Some opponents of public financing argue that contribution and 
expenditure limits “are unlikely to effectively restrain candidates and 
parties involved in competitive elections for high stakes.”206  
According to a report published by the Cato Institute, the public’s 
trust in government has continued to decline since public financing 
was first instituted for the presidential elections in 1976, thus 
undermining the theory that public financing systems counteract the 
appearance of corruption that can result from large campaign 
contributions.207  The author of the report, John Samples, further 
argues that the government should not be in the business of easing 
the burden associated with fundraising for a political campaign, which 
is fundamentally a private problem.208  Samples has also argued that 
nearly all campaign finance law, at least on the federal level, is an 
intrusion upon citizens’ First Amendment rights.209  He contends that 
 
 200. Malbin et al., supra note 191, at 6.  New York City has 5,733 census block 
groups that each have between 600 and 3,000 people.  CFI found that 5,128 of these 
block groups were home to at least one donor-to-candidate pair. Id. 
 201. GENN ET AL., supra note 199, at 10. 
 202. Id. at 13. 
 203. Id. at 14–15. 
 204. MIGALLY & LISS, supra note 19, at 14. 
 205. Id. at 18 (quoting David Yassky). 
 206. John Samples, The Failures of Taxpayer Financing of Presidential Campaigns, 
CATO INST. 3 (Nov. 25, 2003), http://www.cato.org/doc-download/sites/ 
cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa500.pdf. 
 207. Id. at 5–6. 
 208. Id. at 13–14. 
 209. JOHN SAMPLES, THE FALLACY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 1 (2006); see 
also Bradley Smith, The Myth of Campaign Finance Reform, NAT’L AFF., Winter 
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on the whole, contribution limits will reduce the amount of political 
speech, while having no measurable impact on the existence or 
appearance of corruption.210  Similarly, in an article published by 
National Affairs in 2010, Bradley Smith maintains that contributions 
do not corrupt politicians.211 
The Supreme Court has rejected the theory that large contributions 
have no relationship to corruption.212  Indeed, the potential for such 
corruption is widely accepted as the primary justification for the First 
Amendment burden that results from restrictions on the amount of 
money spent on political speech.213  Moreover, the notion that the 
difficulties associated with campaign fundraising are fundamentally a 
private issue overlooks the fact that fair and clean elections, in which 
candidates have the ability to share their beliefs and ideas regardless 
of their financial means, are in the best interest of the government 
and its citizens.  Finally, both Samples and Smith focused their 
analyses on the presidential public financing system, which faces 
different challenges than New York City’s system.  The presidential 
system, as detailed by Samples’s report for the Cato Institute, has 
declined in efficacy in recent years, culminating in President Obama’s 
decision to opt out of the program as a candidate in 2008.214  
Conversely, as demonstrated by the CFI report described above, the 
New York City Program has been increasingly successful at 
encouraging small donations from a diverse pool of contributors and 
has maintained a high percentage of candidate participation. 
Others argue that there is no problem to cure; that in holding that 
corporations can spend unlimited amounts on elections, the Supreme 
 
2010, at 75, 88, available at http://www.nationalaffairs.com/doclib/ 
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Court has done nothing more than protect the First Amendment.215  
They contend that more spending merely leads to more political 
discourse, which is the highest form of speech.216  This argument fails 
to recognize the corrupting influence of this unfettered spending in 
modern day campaigning.217  First Amendment considerations must 
be balanced by protections against such corruption for ordinary 
citizens, as both candidates and contributors, to be a relevant part of 
the political process. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has ushered in an era in which 
self-financed candidates and wealthy individuals and organizations 
can spend independently on elections in unprecedented amounts, 
while simultaneously limiting the options for combating this effect.  In 
order to avoid the hijacking of our elections by this flood of money, 
elections must be returned to the ordinary citizen.218  One way to 
achieve this goal is to encourage these citizens to participate through 
a small donor multiple match system.  New York City’s landmark 
program has proven effective at increasing participation and is viewed 
as a model for other public financing systems on the local, state, and 
federal level. 
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